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Abstract 
Few words are being used so frequently in the study of religion as the word 
fundamentalism. Even though the term was coined more than a century ago, it was 
with the establishment of the post-revolutionary hierocracy in Iran that it became part 
of common language. At the same time there are scholars who reject the term 
fundamentalism as an analytical tool regarding Iran. According to Ervand 
Abrahamian, Third World Populism is a more adequate term in describing the post-
revolutionary hierocracy in Iran.  
 
This paper seeks to examine the strengths and shortcomings of Abrahamian’s 
criticism of fundamentalism relative the post-revolutionary hierocracy in Iran. This is 
done by an analysis of the relationship between religious fundamentalism and 
modernity. In so doing I conclude that it is possible and plausible to define 
fundamentalism in such a way that it can be applied to the theocracy in Iran. 
  
Key words: Post-revolutionary Iran, Fundamentalism, Khomeini, Modernity 
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 4 
Introduction 
On Thursday 1st February 1979, Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, after 14 years 
of exile, returned to Iran from Neauphle-le-Château, a small village outside of Paris. 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Iranian king, or King of kings as he preferred to be 
called had already fled the country. In less than two weeks, the end of the monarchy, 
one of the oldest in history, was official and a new era began in the modern history of 
Iran; the era of the post-revolutionary hierocracy. Shortly after the consolidation of 
the theocracy in Iran, the term religious fundamentalism found its way back in the 
academic writings on religion.  
 
The Islamic revolution in Iran contradicted in a brutal way the secularization thesis on 
its very logical foundation and thereby gave rise to several serious questions. How 
could the anti-modernist clerics seize political power through a modern urban 
revolution in a modern nation like Iran? Was the explanation to be found in the nature 
of Islam or the Iranian society? What if the term fundamentalism was a misnomer 
altogether? How is the hierocracy in post-revolutionary Iran to be understood? Some 
scholars regard its consolidation as the starting point of the new fundamentalism. 
Others reject the term fundamentalism, due to its un-Islamic origin. Among scholars 
who dismiss the term is the historian Ervand Abrahamian who believes Third World 
Populism1 is more adequate in describing the post-revolutionary hierocracy in Iran.  
 
Abrahamian rejects fundamentalism, partly due to the term’s origin, it being a 
description of the Protestant Movement in the 1920s in the US. The main argument 
against the term, however, is its incommensurability with modernity. In this paper I 
try to examine these arguments and with the help of scholars who define 
fundamentalism as a modern phenomenon, I try to move beyond the paradoxes that 
rise in relation to fundamentalism and modernity.    
 
The first section briefly reviews the objective of this paper and the questions it seeks 
to answer followed by the method and theory used, and limitations explained. The 
next section reviews the previous research on the subject, with emphasis on Bruce 
Lawrence’s book The Defenders of God2. Thereafter, follows some historic 
background on the subject and after that are discussed Abrahamian’s arguments 
against the understanding of khomeinism as a pre-modern phenomenon, and his 
rejection of fundamentalism based on its incommensurability with modernity. This is 
followed by an analysis of the scholars who, in contrast to Abrahamian, put 
fundamentalism at the centre of modernity. Finally, the essay argues for 
fundamentalism as an analytical tool in describing the post-revolutionary hierocracy 
in Iran. 
 
A note on non-English sources: unless otherwise stated, all translations to English are 
mine. 
                                                
1 Abrahamian defines Third World Populism as “a movement of the propertied middle class that 
mobilizes the lower classes, especially the urban poor, with radical rhetoric directed against 
imperialism, foreign capitalism, and the political establishment.” Abrahamian; E. (1993); p. 17 
2 Lawrence; B. B. (1989). 
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Objective and questions 
Objective of this paper  
The objective of this paper is thus to analyse fundamentalism relative to the Iranian 
revolution. In so doing I will review Abrahamian’s main argument against 
fundamentalism as a scientific concept, and his argument in favour of populism in 
order to describe the post-revolutionary hierocracy in Iran. I will then contrast 
Abrahamian’s argument with scholars who define the hierocracy in Iran as 
fundamentalist. Thus the questions this paper seeks to answer are the following: 
  
1. Is khomeinism a pre-modern movement? 
2. Is modernity and fundamentalism mutually exclusive? 
3. Can fundamentalism and populism be combined? 
4. Is fundamentalism as a concept an appropriate analytical tool in our 
understanding of the theocracy3 in Iran?  
Limitations and method 
It is important to point out what this paper will not do. Although I will discuss 
fundamentalism as an historical and political phenomenon, I will do so solely in 
relation to khomeinism. The hierocracy in Iran is unique in several respects. It is the 
first one, among religious-political movements to seize political power, and it did so 
through a popular urban revolution. The situation in Iran was in this respect radically 
different from the Taliban-movement in Afghanistan or today’s ISIS in Iraq and 
Syria. Hence I will not discuss any other cases of Islamic radicalism. The reason is 
partially due to the limited space here but more importantly, due to the different 
origins of these movements. 
 
Another limitation concerns fundamentalism as concept in the public space, the so-
called Bürgerliche Öffentlichkeit. Although fundamentalism as a concept seems quite 
popular, especially in the mass media, I will only focus on the academic research in 
the area. While an interesting project, there is simply no space here to examine the 
way media uses the term.  
Method 
The method used in this paper is literature studies, an analysis of different discourses 
regarding fundamentalism and its application to the Iranian case. I do this by reading 
representatives for different approaches towards the subject, notably literature on 
fundamentalism in general and on the Iranian revolution in particular. By comparing 
                                                
3 The term hierocracy is a more apt term in describing the post-revolutionary state in Iran, than 
theocracy since the clerics are the political rulers in Iran. Theocracy, which means Government of God, 
does not necessarily require the direct rule of the clerics. However throughout the text the terms 
hierocracy and theocracy will be used interchangeably.  
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these texts, hopefully, I will show why fundamentalism is a proper concept in 
describing the post-revolutionary hierocracy in Iran. 
Theory 
In this paper I will follow Bruce Lawrence’s comparative study on fundamentalism 
within the Abrahamic faiths, Defenders of God. I particularly find Lawrence’s 
distinction between modernity and modernism useful. This distinction allows him to 
define fundamentalism as an anti-modernist phenomenon generated through 
modernity. Thus Lawrence is able to move beyond the apparent contradiction between 
fundamentalisms as a reactionary movement, with a pre-modern Weltanschauung, yet 
a product of modern society.  
 
Bruce Lawrence defines fundamentalism, modernity and modernism as follows: 
 
Fundamentalism is the affirmation of religious authority as holistic and absolute, admitting of 
neither criticism nor reduction; it is expressed through the collective demand that specific 
creedal and ethical dictates derived from scripture be publicly recognized and legally 
enforced. 
 
Modernity is the emergence of a new index of human life shaped, above all, by increasing 
bureaucratization and rationalization as well as technical capacities and global exchange 
unthinkable in the premodern era. 
 
Modernism is the search for individual autonomy driven by a set of socially encoded values 
emphasizing change over continuity; quantity over quality; efficient production, power, and 
profit over sympathy for traditional values or vocations, in both the public and private 
spheres.4 
 
Fundamentalism in this perspective is an urban and active movement that while truly 
anti-modernist, it shares common ground with modernists. Fundamentalists and 
modernists are both universalists5 and both have their own set of solutions to the 
anxiety caused by relativism. “Without modernity, there are no fundamentalists, just 
as there are no modernists.”6 This approach is particularly useful regarding the 
revolution in Iran, as a modern and urban revolution and resolves the contradictions 
that the Iranian revolution brought; namely that fundamentalism in fact succeeded in 
the most modernized country in the Middle East.  
Previous research on the subject 
The rise of the clerics to political power in Iran was the starting gun for scientific 
research on fundamentalism that went beyond the generic case in the US in the 1920s.  
Bruce Lawrence’s book is one of the earliest contributions on this subject. Lawrence 
argues that fundamentalism is an ideology generated by modernity and at the same 
                                                
4 Lawrence B. B. op. cit. p. 27.  
5 ”Modernism/fundamentalism is best understood when viewed as a subset of a larger, longer battle 
between universalism and monadism [ i. e. relativism]. Universalism claims all as ultimately one. 
Monadism sees all as provisionally many. […] The fundamentalists, […] declare themselves to be 
advocates of universalist norms. Their norms are not discoverable. They have been revealed once and 
for all. They are codified in holy writ. They require ascent not debate. They are understood by faith not 
by reason.” Lawrence; B. B. op. cit. pp. 40-41.  
6 p. 2. 
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time it is in conflict with modernism. By following Marshal Berman’s distinction 
between modernity and modernism, Lawrence is able to place fundamentalism at the 
centre of modernity, and hence free fundamentalism as a scientific concept from the 
straight jacket put on it by the historical circumstances surrounding the term.  
 
Other pioneering research in the comparative sociology of religion that tries to define 
fundamentalism in such a way so that it can move beyond its entanglement in the 
early decades of the 20th century, is Martin Riesebrodt’s seminal study, Pious 
Passion7 first published in German 1990. In this book, fundamentalism becomes a 
sociological problem and is defined as “an urban movement directed primarily against 
the dissolution of personalistic, patriarchal notions of order and social relations and 
their replacement by depersonalized principles, […] a qualitative change in virtually 
all social relations, interactions and institutions.”8  
 
Pious Passion is also interesting as one of the first books to compare Shi’ite and 
Protestant fundamentalism. Riesebrodt does that by criticizing a “perspective 
internalized by many since Max Weber’s The Economic Ethic of the World Religions, 
[…] the drawing of historical comparisons from the point of view of the particular 
development of the West.”9 The criticism is due to the fact that in this perspective the 
West has become the ‘normal’ and the rest ‘the exotic’ case. As we will see this is one 
of the main reasons the term fundamentalism is discarded when it comes to non-
Protestant religious movements. Pious Passions, on the contrary, treats all societies as 
equally ‘normal’ or ‘exotic’. 
 
Another contribution in the area is the ambitious and voluminous The 
Fundamentalism Project, which is the result of a decade of case studies and 
interdisciplinary research on the subject that resulted in five massive volumes. Here 
the authors try to make a general theoretical framework to grasp and compare 
fundamentalism within the large religions around the globe, and thus go beyond 
Bruce Lawrence’s limited analysis within the Abrahamic religions. As Gabriel A. 
Almond et al explain in Strong Religion, which is a summarization of The 
Fundamentalism Project:  
 
”The fundamentalists.” Is it correct to generalize? Strong religion argues, in effect, that while 
Islam has produced a particularly virulent and potentially global form of radical 
fundamentalism, other major religious traditions have also given birth to movements that can 
be fruitfully compared with the Islamist movements (as well as to the original Christian case 
of the 1920s).10 
 
Yet another book of importance, regarding the Iranian revolution is the sociologist 
Mansoor Moaddel’s Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian revolution11. 
Moaddel’s book is important for several reasons. The books mentioned earlier try to 
theorize fundamentalism as a general theory regarding either fundamentalism in 
general, or within the Abrahamic faiths. Moaddel, on the other hand, focuses solely 
on the Iranian context, and especially the revolution that brought the clerics to power. 
He does so by analysing the role ideology and discourse played in the revolution. 
                                                
7 Riesebrodt; M. (1993). 
8 p. 9.  
9 p. 8. 
10 Almond; A. G. et al. (2003); p. 6. 
11 Moaddel; M. (1993). 
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Thus the question for Moaddel is why none of the secular discourses, Marxism or 
secular Nationalism, were able to mobilize the mass protests against the monarchy, 
and instead it was “the Shi’i discursive field”12 that managed to articulate the protests 
against the shah and led the revolutionary movement to its success.  
 
In this paper I will use these earlier scholars to try to show that the post-revolutionary 
hierocracy in Iran indeed is fundamentalist. I will show that the Iranian case is unique 
in that it is the only one among fundamentalist movements to actually seize political 
power through a popular revolution13 and thus end up in a radically new position, 
namely in power as opposed to opposition.  
                                                
12 Moaddel; M. (1993); pp. 154-163. 
13 Khomeinism is so far the only case when a radical religious movement seize political power through 
a popular revolution. The two other cases where Islamists has seized political power, notably the 
Taliban in Afghanistan and the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant cannot be explained 
without the external factors. Taliban came to power as a direct consequence of USSR’s invasion of 
Afghanistan and the limitless support the Afghan Mujahedin received from the US. The Islamic State 
also rose as a Sunni revolt in reaction to Iraq’s occupation, the Iranian supported Shia-government in 
Iraq and the war in Libya and Syria. The pre-revolutionary monarchy in Iran, by contrast had no 
enemies on the international scene. For an excellent analysis of the Islamic State see Cockburn; P. 
(2015). 
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A brief historical background 
For a large part of the 20th century, among many scholars and social scientists, it was 
understood that the Western world was witnessing a constant withdrawal of religion 
from the public space, i. e. religious faith would become more and more 
individualized and a private matter. In so far that religion would exist, it would do so 
as “a historical artifact, part of cultures of long-gone, superstitious peoples.”14 Seen in 
the prism of the secularization thesis this was what would happen as a consequence of 
urbanization and cultural pluralism, which itself was a consequence of modernization. 
The idea, following the classic sociologist Max Weber, was that secularization 
demystifies and disenchants the world.  
 
Around the end of the 1960s, in an almost prophetic prediction about the future of 
religion in the world, Peter L. Berger, perhaps the leading proponent of the 
secularization thesis, could anticipate that in the 21st century there will only be small 
isolated enclaves of religious people gathering together to avoid the surrounding 
secular world.15 The secularization process was not only visible in Western Europe 
regarding Christianity, but also in countries with a Muslim majority with one major 
difference. In the ‘Islamic World’, “modernizing dictators” 16 introduced from above 
secularization and modernization.  
 
If the Enlightenment in the West occurred as part of a more general democratization 
process, the phenomenon in the Muslim world in general, and Iran in particular, took 
the opposite direction. Religion and religiosity was seen as the main reason behind the 
country’s inferiority compared to the Western societies and the cure was the end of 
religion and traditions by brute force.  
 
From the 1950’s after the UK-and US-initiated coup d’état, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi 
started his autocracy. During this period Iran was “the most modern country both on 
the socioeconomic and political level”17 in the Middle East. The monarchy in the 
country was seen as a divine gift and according to the Empress Farah: “[It] has a 
special meaning for Iranian families. It is in our way-of-life. It has been an integral 
part of our history for 2500 years.”18 She was by no means alone in her perception. 
Iran was generally characterized as “an island of peace and tranquillity in the stormy 
waters of world politics.”19  
 
All of this would soon come to change. In a short period, 1977-1979, massive street 
demonstrations that would multiply into millions, together with worker’s strike 
brought down the monarchy in Iran.20,21 The revolution 1979 was like earlier 
                                                
14 Emerson; O. M. & Hartman; D. (2006); p. 128. 
15 Sander; Å. & Andersson; D. (2015); p. 42.  
16 Sachedina; A. A. (1991); p. 410. 
17 Losurdo; D. (2004); p. 10. 
18 Farah Pahlavi quoted in Abrahamian; E. (1989); p. 9. 
19 Moaddel; M. (2005); p. 240. 
20 ”The Iranian Revolution was one of the most popular upheavals in world history: 10 percent or more 
of the Iranian population participated in the demonstrations and general strike that toppled Shah 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. By comparison, less than 2 percent of the population participated in the 
French Revolution.” Kurzman; Ch. (2004); pp. vi-viii. 
“The regime [i. e. the monarchy] was brought down by the largest protest demonstrations ever seen in 
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revolutions in history unexpected, or as some would say “unthinkable”22, yet the 
outcome of the revolution was even more perplexing.23 Indeed “few considered the 
rise of theocracy in a modernized state a possibility, and even fewer thought it might 
result from a popular revolution.”24 
 
The emergence of the hierocracy in Iran contradicted the secularization thesis in a 
brutal way, and for the first time in modern history, religion was not only an integral 
part of the organization of society, but in a totalitarian manner it embraced political 
power in a way that few theocracies from the Middle Ages even dared to dream of.   
 
Some decades later when radical and violent interpretations of all major religions in 
every corner of the globe were a reality, Peter Berger explains that “secularization 
theory failed to anticipate something: that the demystification of the world provided 
within it the seeds both for the remystification of the world and resistance to the 
demystification.”25 Berger who now had abandoned the secularization thesis argues in 
the opposite direction: “The religious impulse, has been a perennial feature of 
humanity (…) it would require something close to a mutation of the species to 
extinguish this impulse for good (…) the world today (…) is as furiously religious as 
it ever was.”26  
 
Soon after the dust of revolution in Iran was settling and the real picture of the post-
revolutionary hierocracy was getting clearer, the term fundamentalism found its ways 
back to the scholarly and medial description of Iran, and hence many social scientists 
and historians seem to agree that the revolution in Iran 1979 is the starting point for 
the emergence of the new fundamentalism.27 
 
At the same time, there seems to be an understanding of the theocracy in Iran, by 
virtue of it being Muslim and thus pre-modern, as more a natural ground for 
fundamentalism (here understood as fanaticism) to grow out of. This is perhaps most 
visible in a quote of Peter Berger, regarding his analysis of the Christian 
fundamentalists in the States: “The fanatical mullahs have been let loose in the land, 
this land.”28 But not everyone seems to agree on this description of the hierocracy in 
Iran.  
 
                                                                                                                                       
human history (over 2 million in one occasion in Tehran, millions more in other cities) and probably 
the most prolonged and successful general strike in world history as well.” Moaddel; M. (1993); p. 201. 
21 For a brief history of the events that eventually led to the culmination of the revolution in 1979 see 
Abrahamian, E. (1982); Chapter 11, (1989); pp. 29-41 & (2008); pp. 155-162, Arjomand; S. A. (1988); 
chapters 6-7 and Nedjati; Gh. R. (1991); vol. ii, pp.91-126.  
22 Kurzman; Ch. op. cit. p. 1. 
23 As one scholar summarized it, the Islamic revolution in Iran “has indeed a good claim to being the 
surprise of the century, a century not devoid of surprises.” Arjomand; S. A. op. cit. p. 3. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Emerson; M. O. & Hartman; D. op. cit. p. 128. 
26 Peter Berger quoted in Sander; Å. & Andersson; D. op. cit. p. 51. 
27 “Although there were earlier movements [such as the Jewish Gush Emunim (the Block of the 
Faithful) in 1974], the Iranian Revolution was the first unmistakable indicator of a growing 
phenomenon.” Emerson; M. O. & Hartman; D. op. cit. p.132. See also Almond; G. A. et al. (2003); p. 
1, and Risebrodt; M. (1993); p. 1. 
28 Peter Berger quoted in Riesebrodt; M. op. cit. p. 2. 
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Ervand Abrahamian29 is today one of the leading scholars of the modern political 
history of Iran. He has written quite extensively on the subject and his magnum opus 
Iran Between two Revolutions30 is considered the standard text in the field. In a 
collection of essays called Khomeinism31 he argues against the general identification 
of the state in Iran as fundamentalist, while he argues in favour of Third World 
Populism as a more adequate description of the post-revolutionary hierocracy in Iran. 
In this paper I will analyse Abrahamian’s arguments and criticism of the description 
of the hierocracy in Iran as fundamentalist.   
 
I will specifically examine his arguments regarding the relationship between 
fundamentalism and modernity and his view on fundamentalism as an historical 
concept and try to show that, although Abrahamian’s arguments in some of his 
criticism of the way scholars in the West have identified the Islamic Republic in Iran 
seems justified, rejecting fundamentalism and replacing it with populism seems to 
lack argumentative support.   
 
While Abrahamian is an important scholar in the field, his criticism alone would 
hardly qualify for an examination of the differences among scholars regarding the 
state in contemporary Iran. The fact is, already from the early days of the clergy’s 
seizure of political power in Iran, there have existed a political discourse that 
underestimates the role religion plays as ideology in political power.  
 
In this view the hierocracy in Iran has the potential to transform to a ‘normal’ state 
where “it contains the potential for change and acceptance of modernity- even 
eventually of political pluralism, gender equality, individual rights, and social 
democracy.”32  
                                                
29 Born in Iran as an Armenian-Iranian he was raised in England. He teaches at the City University of 
New York (CUNY) where he is Distinguished Professor of History at Baruch College. 
30 Abrahamian; E. (1982). 
31 Abrahamian; E. (1993). 
32 pp. 2-3. 
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Material 
Fundamentalism as contested concept 
Before I start my analysis of Abrahamian’s argument against fundamentalism, a brief 
historic review of the term is required. Like many other concepts in social sciences, 
fundamentalism is a disputed term, which “still lacks a commonly accepted definition 
or application”.33 After all, the same label is used to describe Hezbollah, the militant 
Islamist movement in Lebanon as well as the pacifist Amish.  
 
In recent years, ever since the attacks on Pentagon and the World Trade Centre in 
2001, the term has been used on a variety of political and religious movements in the 
world. This generality of the term is in reality also its greatest weakness due to the 
simple fact that “any term which tried to cover everything would end up meaning 
nothing in particular, since signs work by virtue of their differences”.34  
 
Thus, in order for fundamentalism to be useful, it needs to be clearly defined in 
relation to the subject it tries to describe. How fundamentalism is defined, depends on 
the perspective one uses. It can be defined as an endeavour to defend the 
fundamentals in the faith. The early Protestant fundamentalists in the US fall within 
this category. This definition, which is perfectly reasonable, is a trans-historical 
definition that does not depend on the social context, and is not defined in relation to 
modernity. 
 
In light of this view Martin Luther and also contemporary Muslim feminists can be 
regarded fundamentalists. The reason is simple enough. Martin Luther’s attack on 
Rome and Catholic Church was based on two central beliefs: that the Bible is the 
central religious authority and that humans may reach salvation only by their faith and 
not by their deeds, which was an attack on Catholic Church’s corrupt practice of 
selling ‘indulgences’ to absolve sin.35 Luther’s attack on the Vatican was in other 
words based on the fundamentals he defined, which Catholic Church had betrayed.  
 
Contemporary Muslim feminists, who work for a feminist interpretation of the canons 
of Islam, argue in a similar way. In her criticism of the discrimination against women 
in the Saudi education system, Amani Hamdan- to take one example among many- 
argues: “it is vital to differentiate between the essential teachings of Islam on the one 
hand, and the diverse cultural practices that exist among Muslims on the other 
hand.”36 Here, the ‘essential teachings of Islam’ can be seen as the fundamentals, 
which is to be defended against ‘the diverse cultural practices’.37 
                                                
33 Riesebrodt; M. op. cit. p. 10. 
34 Eagleton; T. (1996); p. 103. 
35 Grane; L. (1994); pp. 68-88. 
36 Hamdan; A. (2012); p. 210. For similar arguments see Hamdan; A. (2005); p. 55.      
37 What Hamdan defines as the ‘essential teachings of Islam’, is beside the point here. The point is that 
in order for her to dismiss what she defines as ‘the diverse cultural practices’, she needs to refer to what 
she defines as the ‘essentials teachings of Islam’. Obviously there are different interpretations of what 
constitute the ‘essentials teachings of Islam’, a fact that historically has led to different jurisprudent 
schools. To be sure one can argue about the choices of the ‘essentials’, the point here is simply that a 
set of ‘essentials’ are chosen (and not necessarily on an arbitrary basis) in order to criticise the non-
essential aspects. 
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In fact this trans-historical definition makes it possible to even apply the term on 
secular phenomenon. Seen in this light, nearly every important thinker among 
socialists in the early decades of the 20th century, be it V. I. Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg 
or Antonio Gramsci, were all fundamentalists in that they were trying to find solutions 
to the political problems of their time by turning back to what they each in their own 
way defined as the fundamentals in Karl Marx’s thoughts. Defined in this way, 
Khomeini and the Islamic movement during and after the revolution was not and, 
more importantly, could not38 be fundamentalist. 
 
Fundamentalism can also be defined as an anti-modernist movement born and 
developed within the bosom of modernity, a modern phenomenon, not in the sense 
that it is modern in its Weltanschauung, quite the contrary. It is defined as a modern 
phenomenon in the sense that it can only be generated in modern society.39 I will 
return to this definition and explore this matter further.   
 
There seems to be some resistance on using fundamentalism outside its birthplace in 
general, and a tendency to reject the concept tout court when it comes to Islam in 
particular. The first part is based on the fact that there are only Protestants in the US 
in the 1920s that ever used the term to describe themselves. There is no group among 
non-Christians, especially among Jews or Muslims who uses the term approvingly. 
The second part is that the term, being part of the Western culture, simply is 
incommensurable with the non-Western culture, be it the Muslim world or the Jewish 
one. These statements seem to have poor argumentative support though.  
 
The argument-that no non-Christians can be fundamentalist-is marred by reinforcing fallacies. 
One is the claim of exclusion by origin: if you didn’t start it, you can’t have it. The other is the 
nominalist retreat to performer privilege: if you don’t want the name, I must take it back.40   
 
The problem with this ‘originist’ perspective is that, if accepted, then we cannot even 
use the term ‘religion’ in order to describe Christianity or Judaism, since nowhere in 
the Bible is the term ‘religion’ to be found. Nonetheless “places are incidentally 
significant, not historically decisive in the development of socioreligious 
movements.” 41  
Theological arguments against fundamentalism 
Abrahamian’s arguments for rejecting fundamentalism can be summarized in two 
main categories, the first one being religious or theological arguments and the second 
one sociological and historical ones. Based on these arguments “the transference of a 
                                                
38 Generally speaking, there is not much in the Islamic history that supports the Shi’ite version, and 
even less Khomeini’s controversial and innovative interpretation of the Islamic history that enabled 
him to formulate his political program. In this regard, Khomeini was not a traditionalist, quite the 
contrary. “In fact, he was among the first learned religious scholars in Shi’ism to formulate the idea of 
a clergy-centered Islamic state.” Moaddel; M. (2005); p.260.  See Akhavi; Sh. (1999);  pp. 99-100,  and 
Arjomand; S. A. op. cit. pp. 98-99 for similar arguments.  
See also further in this paper, p. 20 where the lack of historical support for Khomeini’s political theory 
in the history of Islam is discussed at length. 
39 ”One cannot speak of premodern fundamentalists. In the premodern era there were not the material 
conditions that made the coherence and communication of fundamentalist ideology possible.” 
Lawrence; B. B. op. cit. p. 2.  
40 p. 92. 
41 p. 93. 
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term [i. e. fundamentalism] invented by early twentieth-century Protestants in North 
America to a political movement in the contemporary Middle East is […] misleading 
and even downright wrong.”42  
Fundamentalism;	  a	  brief	  history	  
The term fundamentalism was coined by Curtis Lee Lewis, the editor of The 
Watchman-Examiner, an American Baptist periodical, in a series of booklets called 
The Fundamentals, published between 1910 and 1915.43 The movement presented 
conservative evangelical Protestants “as militants willing to do “battle royal” to 
preserve the “fundamentals” of the Christian faith”44. The ‘fundamentals’ being  
(i)  inerrancy of the Bible,  
(ii)  strong hostility to any modern theology and critical study of the Bible,  
(iii) exclusion of everyone who does not share their perspective as not ‘true 
Christians’.45  
 
The idea that fundamentalism as a historical and sociological concept is inappropriate 
for other religions than evangelical Christianity is not a novel idea. The renowned 
Biblical scholar James Barr argues along similar lines:  
 
Some kinds of Judaism are very conservative about the Bible. […] Islam can also be said to be 
‘fundamentalistic’: Muslims believe that the Qur’an was verbally revealed to the Prophet in its 
Arabic words, and the exact form of the text was divinely inspired; its purity cannot be 
questioned. […] But the method of this discussion [regarding fundamentalism] will be to take 
the phenomenon within Christianity as the framework.46 
 
However, as Bruce Lawrence argues against this perspective: 
  
Barr’s analysis falters on two questionable assumptions: first, that “attitude toward scripture” 
can be isolated from other motives for espousing a fundamentalist posture, and second, that 
only Protestant Christians give unqualified priority to scripturalism in their religious outlook. 
The pivotal questions reverts to a definition that Barr never offers, the meaning of scripture.47  
 
Abrahamian puts forward another, yet similar argument against the term 
fundamentalism. If fundamentalism is to be understood as the “acceptance of one’s 
scriptural text […] [being] free of human error”, then every Muslim believer 
candidates for the post. “After all, it is an essential article of Islam that the entire 
Koran is the absolute word of God.”48 Several years before Abrahamian published his 
essays on khomeinism, Rev. Patrick J Ryan, former President of Loyola Jesuit 
College, argued along similar lines by rhetorically asking:  
 
Do so-called fundamentalist Muslims differ from other Muslims in their attitude towards the 
Scripture? Are the supporters of the Ayatollah Khomeini […] scriptural literalists opposed to 
the adaptation of scriptural themes to contemporary realities? […] Does his Shi’ite orthodoxy 
consists of a more literal interpretation of the Koran than that favored by any other Iranian 
Muslim?49    
                                                
42 Abrahamian; E. (1991); p. 103, (1993); p. 13.  
43 Riesebrodt; M. op. cit. p. 10. 
44 Almond; G. A. et al. op. cit. p. 2. 
45 Barr; J. (1978); p. 1. 
46 p. 7. 
47 Lawrence; B. B. op. cit. p. 5. 
48 Abrahamian; E. (1991); p. 103, Abrahamian; E. (1993); p. 13. 
49 Ryan; P. J. (1984); pp. 437 & 440. 
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Nevertheless, Martin Riesebrodt argues against this standpoint, it being based on an 
incomplete understanding of Protestant fundamentalism, where it is wrongfully 
reduced to a “conflict between biblical criticism and biblical literalism or between the 
theory of evolution and the doctrine of creation.”50 
 
Thus far we have seen that Islamic fundamentalism is rejected either by arguing that 
an alien Western concept simply cannot be applied on a non-Western phenomenon 
such as Islam, or that the concept is dismissed since, as the argument goes, literal 
interpretation is an essential part of being Muslim, and thus fundamentalism as a 
scientific concept is useless inasmuch as it means literal interpretation, and it cannot 
differentiate between what one means by fundamentalist Muslims and non-
fundamentalist ones.  
 
The problem is that the idea that literal interpretation being an essential part of Islam 
can hardly be defended against historical evidence. It is true that the ‘Ash’ari theology 
–somewhat simplified meaning traditionalist theology- is the dominant version within 
Muslim communities today51, but as early as 700 and 800 A.D. just a century after 
Islam’s birth, there was another school, the so called Mu’tazilites who had a 
contextual and rationalist reading of both the Qur’an and the Hadiths.52  
 
Abrahamian’s rejection of fundamentalism because of its incompatibility with the 
Islamic movement in Iran seems to be based on a conflation between the etymology53 
and the definition of the term fundamentalism. This is a serious problem since if 
etymology is going to be the normative standard regarding a term’s usefulness in 
social sciences, then not many terms can qualify. What makes a scientific term useful 
is how it is defined and more crucial if the term can describe the social reality in a 
satisfactory manner or not.  
Khomeinism; a modern movement? 
Abrahamian’s sociological and historical arguments revolve mainly around 
fundamentalism’s incompatibility with modernity. Thus the main arguments offered 
by him in this regard are to show the modernity of khomeinism. These arguments will 
be reviewed in order to grasp the points Abrahamian is making. Later on I will review 
the premises on which the arguments are built. Consequently the question to answer 
becomes: is fundamentalism incompatible with modernity?  
 
Interestingly enough, Peter Berger makes an objection to a comparison between 
Protestant and Islamic fundamentalism that lands in the same conclusion as 
Abrahamian, though based on the opposite premises. According to Berger “the ideal 
                                                
50 Riesebrodt; M. op. cit. p. 13. 
51 The statement above needs some clarification. Nearly four decades of theocracy in Iran has made the 
demand for secularism, i. e. the separation of the state and religion one of the highest political demands 
in Iran. This does not necessarily mean a decline of religion; rather it is a demand for pluralism in 
interpretations and an end to the clerics monopolisation of God. Separation of the state and religion as a 
demand was even put forward by Ayatollah Montazeri, the highest authority within clerics. See 
Kadivar; M. op. cit. pp. 49-50.  
The hierocracy has also failed to establish an official Islam contra ‘folk’s religion’, which can only 
exist as pluralism within interpretations. See Khaladji; M. op. cit. pp. 68-70. 
52 For a brief discussion regarding these traditions within Islam see Fazlhashemi; M. (2009).  
53 Abrahamian; E. (1991); p. 105, Abrahamian; E. (1993); p. 16.  
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order of protestant fundamentalism is found in the nineteenth century; it is a part of 
Western modernism. The ideal order of Islamic fundamentalism, in contrast, is in the 
seventh century; it is premodern and antimodern.”54. Ernest Gellner, the famous 
British anthropologist also regards Islam as qualitatively different from other major 
faiths since only Islam resists secularization.  
 
At the end of the Middle Ages, the Old World contained four major civilizations. Of these 
three are now, in one measure or another, secularized. Christian doctrine is bowdlerized by its 
own theologians, and deep, literal conviction is not conspicuous by its presence. In the Sinic 
world, a secular faith has become formally established and its religious predecessors 
disavowed. In the Indian world, a state and the elite are neutral viz. what is a pervasive folk 
religion, even if practices such as astrology continue to be widespread. But in one of the four 
civilizations, the Islamic, the situation is altogether different.55 
 
Abrahamian’s	  argument	  against	  khomeinism	  as	  pre-­‐modern	  
If fundamentalism means a rejection of the modern nation state or “a dogmatic 
adherence to tradition and rejection of modern society” then Khomeini was no 
fundamentalist. Furthermore since fundamentalism is starkly associated with 
inflexible orthodoxy, traditional authenticity and rejection of intellectual innovations, 
the term is a misnomer regarding Khomeini, as he not only “discarded many Shii 
concepts”, he freely borrowed words and slogans from the non-Muslim world.56 
 
For Khomeini it was self-evident that Muslims need to import such “essentials as 
technology, industrial plants, and modern civilization”. In fact his disciples often 
mocked the traditional clerics for being ‘traditionalist’ and ‘old-fashioned’; for 
“obsessing over ritual purity; preventing their daughters from going to school; 
insisting that young girls should always be veiled, even when no men were present; 
denouncing such intellectual pursuits as art, music, and chess-playing; and, worst of 
all, refusing to take advantage of newspapers, electricity, cars, airplanes, telephones, 
radios and televisions.”57 Martin Riesebrodt, arguing against Peter Berger makes a 
similar observation: “Islamic fundamentalism in no sense strives to do away with the 
petroleum industry, the modern mass communications media, the automobile, or 
modern weapon systems in order to restore the original community in technological or 
economic terms.”58 
 
Interestingly enough these discussions did actually occur at the beginning of the post-
revolutionary era among clerics. Hashemi Rafsanjani, one of the most important 
figures in the hierocracy, who would become the future president in Iran, in a 
response to some parliamentary deputies’ questions regarding the Islamic precedents 
of some tax laws says: “Where in Islamic history do you find Parliament, President, 
Prime Minister, and Cabinet of Ministers? In fact, eighty per cent of what we do now 
has no precedent in Islamic history.”59   
                                                
54 Riesebrodt; M. op. cit. p. 6. 
55 Ernest Gellner, quoted in Shalgooni; M. R. (2002); p.25. For criticism of Gellner’s view on Islam, 
see ibid. Regarding the secularization process in the theocracy see especially Saleh-Pour; J. (1995) and 
Ganji; A. (1998). 
56 Abrahamian; E. (1991); pp. 104-105, Abrahamian; E. (1993); pp. 15-17. 
57 Abrahamian; E. (1991); pp. 104-105; Abrahamian; E. (1993); p. 16.  
58 Riesebrodt; M. op. cit. p. 7. 
59 Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani quoted in Abrahamian; E. (1991); p. 104; Abrahamian; E. (1993); p. 
15. 
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Khomeini himself observing the rules relating to khoms and zakat60 as being so out of 
their time that he called those who defended their use ‘ignorant’ and out of touch with 
the needs of modern society. “The share of the imam is only enough to run the 
seminaries […] where are we going to get the share of the imam and the sadat [direct 
decedents of Mohammad – to whom zakat belongs] to run a government? We could 
not run all these people who are stuck to the government and cost money.”61 Hojjati-
Kermani another, disciple of Khomeini, argues by the same token. “These 
traditionalists should be labeled reactionary […] for they want us to return to the age 
of the donkey. What we need is not the worship of the past but a genuine […] 
[renaissance].”62   
 
As Domenico Losurdo points it out, “to emphasize the fallacy of explaining 
fundamentalism through the simple dichotomy of premodern vs. modern, one must 
remember that in only one country in the Middle East has fundamentalism been 
successful—Iran, the most modern country both on the socioeconomic and political 
level.”63 
 
The perspective that Khomeinism is a pre-modern movement, is not only in conflict 
with the factual Iranian modern political history, it is also unable to resolve several 
contradictions originating from the perspective. During the Constitutional revolution 
in Iran, Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri- the cleric with the highest rank within Tehran’s clergy 
who had joined the reactionary side and moved against the revolution- was 
condemned and sent to the gallows for “insisting on the ulama’s prerogatives as the 
sole interpreters of the law, and defending monarchical absolutism”64 by a court 
consisting of high ranking clerics, such as Zanjani and Behbahani.65 “About seventy- 
three years later, when, in the debates over the nature of the post-revolutionary 
regime, Ayatollah Khomeini attacked democracy as a Western concept, and thus alien 
to Islam, he was hailed”66, and thousands of Iranians were hoping to get a glimpse of 
his image in the moon.67 Considering Khomeini and the Islamic movement that led the 
revolution a pre-modern phenomenon means nothing less than the amazing statement 
that the Iranian society was more pre-modern in the 1970s than in the 1910s, which is 
palpably false. 
 
In light of this evidence one cannot but to think that viewing khomeinism as pre-
modern is rather an article of faith in the Orientalist tradition than a scientifically 
researched hypothesis. Quite interesting, almost as if Khomeini is arguing against 
Peter Berger regarding the ideal of Islamic fundamentalism belonging to the pre-
modern age, “in the euphoria of revolutionary success, he [i. e. Khomeini] boasted 
that the Islamic Republic of Iran had surpassed all previous Muslim societies, 
including that of the Prophet, in implementing true religion “in all spheres of life 
[…]” In short, the Islamic Republic of Iran had supplanted Mohammad’s Mecca and 
                                                
60 These are different kinds of religious taxes in Islam.  
61 Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini quoted in Shalgooni; M. R. op. cit. p.30 fn. 7.  
62 Mohammad Javad Hojjati Kermani quoted inAbrahamian; E. (1991); 105; (1993); p. 16. 
63 Losurdo; D. op. cit. p. 10. 
64 Moaddel; M. (2005); p. 240. 
65 Khalaji; M. (2010); p. 101. 
66 Moaddel; M. (2005) p. 240. 
67 Shortly after Khomeini’s return to Iran there was this myth in the country that his image could be 
seen in the moon. 
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Imam Ali’s Caliphate as the Muslim Golden Age”68; a statement among some 
traditionalists to be considered as blasphemy. 
 
Khomeini’s	  political	  theory	  and	  his	  break	  with	  Shi’ite	  tradition69	  
Not only was Khomeini not a traditionalist, quite the contrary, he broke against the 
Shi’ite’s eleven-century old tradition where the clergy “referred to […] the velayat-e 
faqih (jurist’s guardianship), as being predominantly apolitical.”70 
 
‘The jurist’s guardianship’, perhaps the most important concept in Khomeini’s 
political and religious discourse -“the cornerstone of the future Islamic Republic”71- 
historically meant the clergy’s guardianship over those who were incapable of looking 
after their own interests: minors, widows and the insane. Even if the concept 
sometimes could be used of the clergy to intervene in political matters, it was 
abundantly clear that it was temporary and only when the whole community was 
endangered. 
 
Khomeini’s political activities started during the 1940s by following the traditional 
Shi’ite view.72 His first major publication criticizes Reza Shah for a number of secular 
sins:  
For closing down seminaries, expropriating religious endowments, propagating anticlerical 
sentiments, replacing shari’a courts with state ones, permitting the consumption of alcoholic 
beverages and the playing of ‘sensuous music’, forcing men to wear Western-style hats, 
establishing coeducational schools, and banning the long veil (chador) thus ‘forcing women to 
go naked into the streets’.73 
 
None of these ‘sins’ meant a denouncement of neither the state nor the monarchy. 
Although in some pages, he confronts Reza shah as the enemy of religion and attacks 
the monarchy since “apart from the royalty of God, all royalty is against the interests 
of the people and oppressive; apart from the law of God, all laws are nul [sic.] and 
absurd. A government of Islamic law, controlled by religious jurists (faqihs) [i. e. the 
clergy] will be superior to all the iniquitous governments of the world”74, he seems in 
general to accept the constitutional monarchy. He repeatedly emphasized that the 
clergy historically had been supportive of the monarchs, even when they had 
practiced anti-Islamic politics, because “bad order was better than no order at all”75. 
 
Throughout the three decades between the 1940s until the 1970s Khomeini held this 
traditionalist view on the state. During the 1960s Mohammad Reza Pahlavi launched 
his so-called White Revolution, which was mainly about land reforms, to which 
Khomeini would refer as “the revolution intended to spread the colonial culture to 
remotest towns and villages and pollute the youth of the country.”76 Khomeini was 
                                                
68 Abrahamian; E. (1991); pp. 103-104, Abrahamian; E. (1993); pp. 14-15. 
69 For an ambitious treatment of the theories of state within Shi’ite jurisprudence cf. Kadivar; M. 
(1997). 
70 Abrahamian; E. (1991); p. 108, Abrahamian; E. (1993); p. 19. 
71 Abrahamian; E. (2008); p. 143. 
72 Moaddel; M. (2005); pp. 258-259. See also Richard; Y. (2003); pp. 191-192. 
73 Abrahamian; E. (1991); p. 109. For similar arguments cf. (1982); p. 424, (1989); p. 20, and (1993); 
p. 20, same author. 
74 Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini quoted in Richard; Y. op. cit. p. 192. 
75 Abrahamian; E. (1991); p. 109, Abrahamian; E. (1993); p. 20.  
76 Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini quoted in Arjomand; S. A.  op. cit. p. 99. 
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now the most vocal critic of these reforms among the clerics. However his main 
criticism was against how he meant the government had abused the clergy, how the 
Shah had become a tool for the “imperialist-Jewish conspiracy” and above all how the 
government was permitting women to vote in local elections, an un-Islamic act if any. 
The criticism against the White Revolution, eventually led to a confrontation between 
protestors and the military in June 1963. The protests were against a governmental bill 
publicized in 1962 according to which the profession of Islam was not a necessary 
condition for the electors and the candidates for the election of town councils. For 
Khomeini this was clearly the first step toward the abolition of Islam and “the 
enfranchisement of women was vigorously denounced as a ploy to destroy family life 
and spread prostitution.”77 
 
Although Khomeini was far from the only cleric who protested against the Shah, his 
attacks differed radically from the rest. Where many clerics occupied themselves with 
the land reforms and women’s rights, “Khomeini, revealing a masterful grasp of mass 
politics, scrupulously avoided the former issue and instead hammered away on a host 
of other concerns that arose greater indignation among the general population.” 78 He 
accused the Shah for being corrupt, rigging elections, jeopardizing the universities 
independence, violating the constitutional law, neglecting the economic needs of 
peasants and workers, and undermining Islam.79 
 
Khomeini’s break with the traditional Shi’ite view on monarchy and the state came in 
early the 1970s when he lived in exile in Najaf, Iraq. During the same time social 
tensions were increasingly sharpened within the Iranian society. The land reforms’ 
complete and utter failure had resulted in a ruined countryside and agriculture, and the 
poor peasants were now flooding the shantytowns in every major city.  
 
By the time of the revolution, 46 per cent of the country’s population lived in urban centers. 
[…] Having received no land whatsoever, they [the rural laborers] survived as farm hands, 
shepherds, laborers, day commuters to nearby towns, and wage earners employed in the many 
small plants that flourished in the countryside during the early 1970s – small plants 
manufacturing carpets, shoes, clothes, and paper. Some migrated to the urban centers. Thus 
the White Revolution failed to provide land to the bulk of the rural population.80    
 
In his frontal attack on the government, Khomeini avoided esoteric questions and 
made his argument based on the socio-economic conditions in the land, by kidnapping 
key concepts from the Marxists dressed in his specific language: 
 
Through the political agents they have placed in power over the people, the imperialists have 
also imposed on us an unjust economic order, and thereby divided our people in two groups: 
oppressors and oppressed. Hundreds of millions of Muslims are hungry and deprived of all 
forms of health care and education, while minorities comprised of all the wealthy and 
powerful live a life of indulgence, licentiousness, and corruption. The hungry and deprived 
have constantly struggled to free themselves from the oppression of their plundering 
                                                
77 Arjomand; S. A. op. cit. p. 85. For an account of the protests in June 1963, which is generally seen as 
the start of the Islamic revolution and the starting point for Khomeini to become the revolution’s 
indisputable leader, see Abrahamian; E. (1982); pp. 424-426, Abrahamian; E. (1989); pp.20-21, Moin; 
B. (1999); Chapter 6 and Nedjati; Gh. R. op. cit. vol. i. pp. 221-238.  
78 Abrahamian; E. (1982); p. 425; see also Abrahamian; E. (1991); p. 113.  
79 Abrahamian; E. (1982); p. 425. 
80 Abrahamian; E. (2008); p. 139. 
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overlords, and their struggle continues to this day. But their way is blocked by ruling 
minorities and the oppressive governmental structures they lead.81 
 
In order to grasp Khomeini’s radical break with Shi’ite tradition about authority over 
the Muslim community, a brief review of the concept imamate is needed.  In the 
Shi’ite tradition there is only the Imams- direct decedents to the Prophet (via Fatima 
his daughter) and Ali the first Imam- who is entitled to rule the Muslim community. 
There had been a total of twelve Imams and the twelfth  “went into “occultation” in 
the ninth century leaving behind four successive interpreters of his will. After the 
death of the fourth, during the “greater occultation” (which continues to the present), 
there is no infallible interpreter of the Twelfth Imam’s will until he reappears as the 
Mahdi to institute the realm of perfection and justice.”82 Khomeini’s “achievement 
was to mount a theoretical argument that empowered precisely the clergy to take over 
executive power and rule on the Imam’s behalf until his return.”83 
 
To this end Khomeini tried to use the historic sources to support his new and radical 
interpretation regarding the questions of the authority. The difficulties in this task 
stemmed from the near total absence of references to Imams in the Qur’an. Neither 
were the traditions of the Prophet (the Sunna) of much help. Instead Khomeini 
referred to a statement by the sixth Imam Ja’far (d. 765) that allegedly empowered 
judges to rule the Shi’ite community in the absence of the Imam. “On closer 
inspection, however, it would appear that the tradition in question authorizes the 
clergy not to exercise sovereign rule but simply to give a ruling in technical disputes 
over inheritance or debts.” Khomeini’s solution to the problem was that he  
 
invoked reason as a source of law and maintained that, since the sources contained many 
references to the clergy as the “fortresses of Islam” and the like, they were the logical 
referents when the sacred texts made mention of leaders of the community after the Prophet’s 
death.84 
 
In a series of lectures that came to be collected as Velayat-e faqih: Hokoumat-e 
eslami85 (The Governance of the Jurist: Islamic Government)86, Khomeini breaks 
radically with the traditionalist Shi’ite political discourse and view on the state. He 
would now argue that Islam is inherently incompatible with all forms of monarchy, 
due to their pagan origin and despotic nature. The rejection of monarchy and 
monarchs had an old lineage in the Abrahamic religions dating all the way back to 
Moses who had opposed the Pharaohs, i. e. the monarch of his time. According to this 
novel interpretation of the Islamic history, opposition against monarchs was a sacred 
duty up to and including the duty to rise up against the government.87  
 
How can we stay silent and idle today, when we see that a band of traitors and usurpers, the 
agents of foreign powers, have appropriated the wealth and the fruits of labor of hundreds of 
millions of Muslims- thanks to the support of their masters and through the power of the 
bayonet-granting the Muslims not the least right to prosperity? It is the duty of Islamic 
scholars and all Muslims to put an end to this system of oppression and, for the sake of the 
                                                
81 Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini quoted in Moaddel; M. (2005); p. 259. 
82 Keddie; N. R. (2003); p. 7, See also Akhavi; Sh. op. cit. pp. 99-100.  
83 Akhavi; Sh. op. cit. p. 100. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Khomeini; R. M. (1970).  
86 See also Richard; Y. op. cit. p. 193 for a brief review of the main themes in the book. 
87 Abrahamian; E. (1993); pp. 23-25.  
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well-being of hundreds of millions of human beings, to overthrow these oppressive 
governments and form an Islamic government.88  
 
This was indeed a radical break with Khomeini’s and the clergy’s traditional view.  
One can also depict the same break in Khomeini’s writings regarding society. In the 
sermons and lectures and publications before the 1970s he hardly uses the terms class 
or revolution, given that both had strong leftist connotations. The change in his 
language is quite conspicuous in his post-1970s writings where he analyses the 
society in new ways. According to this new discourse, society consists of two 
opposing classes, mostazafin (the oppressed) and mostakberin (the oppressors), or the 
poor against the rich.89  
 
More than anything else the new terminology reveals Khomeini’s populism. These 
terms, originating from the Marxist tradition in Iran, went through a transformation at 
Khomeini’s hand. Where Marxists used working class versus bourgeoisie in the 
international Communist tradition, mainly as political and sociological categories, in 
Khomeini’s writing it was transformed to “a loose term used to depict the general 
populace: the meek, the poor, the masses, the powerless, the disinherited, the 
exploited, the dispossessed and, for some, the sansculottes90 [sic.] and the wretched of 
the earth”91, in other words a moral judgment.  
 
Maybe even more obvious was the way the term martyr (shahid) was transformed. 
Before the 1970s he rarely used the term and when it was used, it was in the 
“conventional sense of the famous Shi’i saints who, in obeying God’s will, had gone 
to their deaths”, and for Khomeini the term could never be used to describe an 
average person dying in the streets for the cause. This would also change radically 
during the revolutionary years, 1977-1979, when Khomeini “constantly lauded 
anyone killed in streets as a glorious shahid- as a revolutionary martyr.” 92As usual 
Khomeini more or less plagiarized the other revolutionary movements, notably the 
Tude party (Communist Party), the Mojahedin and the Leftist Guerrilla Movement in 
Iran, who referred to their fallen comrades as martyrs.  
 
Even if the term martyr went through a radical change in Khomeini’s vocabulary, the 
term did in any case exist even in the religious discourse. Khomeini’s abuse of 1st-of-
May tradition in Iran is even more striking. Late in April 1979, shortly after Khomeini 
had taken over the state apparatus, the Islamists, now organized in the Islamic 
Republic Party, discovered that every leftist organization in the country was preparing 
to celebrate the 1st-of-May. In order not to fall behind, the government announced its 
plan to organize its own May Day rally. In his speech, Khomeini warned workers of 
non-believers and reminded them of their true guardians, i. e. Islam. In order to 
suppress the leftist organizations the government upped the minimum wage and 
declared the day a paid public holiday.  More strikingly Khomeini declared: “Every 
                                                
88 Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini quoted in Moaddel; M. (2005); p. 260. 
89Abrahamian; E. (1991); pp. 112-113, Abrahamian; E. (1993); pp. 26-27. 
90 The aristocrats in the pre-revolutionary France to describe the common people of the third estate 
originally used sans-Culotte, literally meaning ‘without short trousers’ as an insult. Eventually the 
revolutionaries adopted the term.  
91 Abrahamian; E. (1989); p. 22. 
92 Abrahamian; E. (1993); p. 27. 
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day should be considered Workers’ Day for labor is the source of all things, even of 
heaven and hell as well as of the atom particle.”93 
 
Through the modern history of Iran, thanks to the size of the organized working class 
and leftist organizations, notably the Tude party, the 1st-of-May was a major event in 
the public opinion. Not surprisingly did the secular organizations get the most support 
from the unions, even though the newspapers in Iran, being scrutinized, did not dare 
to compare the size of the different rallies. However the New York Times wrote that 
the Islamic Republic Party (i. e. the core organization of Khomeini’s followers) drew 
30,000, while the leftist organizations together had more than 100,000 participants.94 
 
In this context the clerics had no other choice than to nullify the Marxist tradition and 
Organizations in the country. In order to accomplish this goal they had to adapt to the 
situations, as they would occur and to take over the secular language of the Marxists 
by transforming it to a religious one. Nowhere is the populist language of Khomeini 
more visible than in his anti-imperialist statements. By inventing populist slogans 
such as “neither West, nor East, Islamic Republic”, “Mostazafin (the oppressed) of 
the world unite”, “The oppressed nations of the world should unite against their 
imperialist oppressors!”95 he could present the Islamic Republic as the alternative 
fighting for social justice and the independence of Iran, some of the most acute 
concerns of the revolutionary movement.  
                                                
93 Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini quoted in Abrahamian; E. (1993); p. 71. 
94 Abrahamian; E. (1993); pp. 72-73. 
95 Ruhollah Musavi Khomein; 1st-of-May Day 1979, speech quoted in Abrahamian; E. (1991); p. 114.   
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Analysis 
Fundamentalism and modernity; a contradictory relation 
If you should go skating 
on the thin ice of modern life 
dragging behind you the silent reproach 
of a million tear-stained eyes 
don't be surprised when a crack in the ice 
appears under your feet. 
You slip out of your depth and out of your mind 
with your fear flowing out behind you 
as you claw the thin ice.96 
 
As we have seen in the last part, Abrahamian uses historical arguments to disprove of 
the perspective on khomeinism as a pre-modern and traditionalist movement. We 
have also seen that he defines fundamentalism mainly in relation to its origin, and 
thus come to the conclusion that khomeinism “has less in common with conventional 
fundamentalism than with Third World populism, especially in Latin America.”97  
 
In this section I will examine the relationship between fundamentalism and 
modernity. As we will see, it is possible and plausible to define fundamentalism in 
such a way that makes it perfectly compatible with modernity.  
 
Let us start by defining Fundamentalism, Modernity and Modernism. 
 
Fundamentalism is the affirmation of religious authority as holistic and absolute, admitting of 
neither criticism nor reduction; it is expressed through the collective demand that specific 
creedal and ethical dictates derived from scripture be publicly recognized and legally 
enforced. 
 
Modernity is the emergence of a new index of human life shaped, above all, by increasing 
bureaucratization and rationalization as well as technical capacities and global exchange 
unthinkable in the premodern era. 
 
Modernism is the search for individual autonomy driven by a set of socially encoded values 
emphasizing change over continuity; quantity over quality; efficient production, power, and 
profit over sympathy for traditional values or vocations, in both the public and private 
spheres.98 
 
According to this view, fundamentalism is a reactive movement. These “movements 
form in reaction to, and in defence against, the processes and consequences of 
secularization and modernization which have penetrated the larger religious 
community.”99  
 
Herein lies the paradox within fundamentalism’s relationship with modernism. Bruce 
Lawrence, in following Marshal Berman’s classic work on modernity and modernism 
All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience Of Modernity, makes a distinction 
                                                
96 Pink Floyd; (1979); track 2. 
97 Abrahamian; E. (1991); p. 118, Abrahamian; E. (1993); p. 17. 
98 Lawrence; B. B. op. cit. p. 27. 
99 Almond; G. A. et al. op. cit. p. 93. 
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between modernity and modernism and explains, “fundamentalists are moderns but 
they are not modernists. [On the contrary, they] oppose modernism and its 
proponents”.100 In other words  
 
“Fundamentalism”, […] refers to a discernible pattern of religious militance by which self-
styled “true believers” attempt to arrest the erosion of religious identity, fortify the borders of 
the religious community, and create viable alternative to secular institutions and behaviours.101  
 
Consequently fundamentalism is a religious response to the marginalization of 
religion and the increasing anxiety that follows the process of modernization, 
individualization, secularization and the disintegration of the religious community. 
Therefore fundamentalism is one way among many to respond to the identity crisis 
that occurs as a consequence of modernization and urbanization. Hence  
 
without modernity, there are no fundamentalists, just as there are no modernists. The identity 
of fundamentalism, both as a psychological mindset and a historical movement, is shaped by 
the modern world. Fundamentalists seem bifurcated between their cause and their outcome; 
they are at once the consequence of modernity and the antithesis of modernism.102  
 
This is the reason why fundamentalists are selective in their relation to modernity.103 
Fundamentalism is thus a reaction to an insecure world- a world where relativism, 
pluralism, secularism and the indeterminacy of modern ideologies- is making God the 
absolute and infallible judge obsolete. In other words, “the latent significance of 
modernity is humanity’s revolt against God.”104 
 
In this urbanized and modernized world, individualism replaces the safe and secure 
ground of religious community and every individual is forced to be responsible for 
themselves. In this milieu one “is to experience personal and social life as a 
maelstrom, to find one’s world and oneself in perpetual disintegration and renewal, 
trouble and anguish, ambiguity and contradiction: to be part of a universe in which all 
that is solid melts into air.”105 In such a “heartless world” and such “soulless 
conditions”,  “religious misery is at one and the same time the expression of real 
misery and a protest against real misery.”106  
 
Through modern ideologies such as rationalism, relativism, pluralism or secularism, 
modernity undermines the “Divine Transcendent, challenging his revelations, denying 
his prophets, ignoring his morally guided community.” In such a world “the righteous 
remnants are emissaries of an All-Powerful, All-Knowing Being who has been 
betrayed by the freedom he granted the modern age. Who are the fundamentalists? 
They are the last-ditch defenders of God.”107 Thus fundamentalism in this respect is a 
religious-political response to the identity crisis and the existential anxiety brought 
upon by modernity.  
 
                                                
100 Lawrence; M. op. cit. pp. 1 & 2. 
101 Almond; G. A. op. cit. p. 17, italics removed. 
102 Lawrence; B. B. op. cit. p. 2. 
103 Almond; G. A.; op. cit. pp. 94-95. 
104 Almond; G. A. op. cit. p. 38. 
105 Marshal Berman quoted in Lawrence; B. B. op. cit. p. 1. 
106 Marx; K. (1981); p. 378. 
107 Lawrence; B. B. op. cit. ix. 
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In light of this perspective let me review the pre-revolutionary Iranian society. It is 
true that Khomeini referred to political repression, the uneven distribution of the 
nation’s wealth, the destitute marginalized people struggling in the shantytowns. But 
that alone cannot explain the success of the Islamic discourse, especially if one 
considers the fact that during the 1960s and the 1970s, i. e. the formative period of the 
Islamic revolutionary discourse, the Iranian economy bloomed more than ever before.  
 
During this formative and imperative period, it was not only the clerics who referred 
to Islam as the universal solution to all the social and political problems in the 
country. The rapid cultural Westernization that occurred after the 1953 coup d’état, 
together with “massive rural-urban migration; cultural alienation; autocracy; hostility 
to the US”108 created a natural ground for popular resentment and an increasing anti-
Westernism.109 “If a significant section of the intellectual leaders found an Islamic 
solution meaningful, it was principally due to the very fact that they all faced the same 
ideological target-the secularist ideology of the monarchy.”110  
 
The themes of Shi’i revolutionary discourse (that Iran’s problem was related to the West’s 
cultural domination and the un-Islamic nature of the institution of monarchy, and that there 
was a religious solution to these problems) contradicted in essence the monarchy-centered 
nationalist discourse.111 
 
Jalal Al-e Ahmad, the leading intellectual of a new generation Iranian thinkers 
summarized the nation’s identity crisis in his book Westoxication. A former member 
of the Tude (Communist) Party, he had converted to Islam and in a reinterpretation of 
the Iranian history, he targeted the Westoxication, i. e. adherence to ideas foreign to 
the Iranian culture as the main problem and a return to the cultural roots of the Iranian 
people, which he found in Islam, as the political solution.112   
 
By offering an absolute and inerrant reference-point, namely the “privileged school of 
Islamic jurisprudence”113, Khomeini could offer a simplistic solution to a nation in 
crisis. If uncertainty, relativism and individualism is modernity’s birthmark, where 
“the total responsibility of every human being is on herself”114, Khomeinism is the 
direct opposite. “The Islamic government is the rule of divine laws on the nation. […] 
In this government the governance belongs to God, and the law is God’s order. 
Everyone, from the Prophet to the Caliphs have to obey God’s law.”115  
 
Theocracy and the ideological state 
The post-revolutionary hierocracy in Iran is more than anything else an ideological 
state. By that I mean a political system where the rulers are trying to reorganize and 
reshape the totality of the society after their ideology. This is the main reason why the 
                                                
108 Keddie; N. R. (1995); p. 15. 
109 Richard; Y. op. cit. p. 187. 
110 Moaddel; M. (2005); p. 250. “The postcoup social critics ideologues began to resort to Islam in their 
attempt’s to address Iran’s problem.” Moaddel; M. (1993); p. 144.  
111 Moaddel; M. (1993); p. 268. 
112 For a brief review of Al-e Ahmad’s important contribution to the Islamic political discourse in the 
pre-revolutionary period see Richard; Y. op. cit. pp. 189-190 & Moaddel; M. (2005); pp. 251-255.  
113 Almond; G. A. op. cit. p. 96. 
114 Sartre; J. P. (1988); p. 37. 
115 Khomeini; R. M. op. cit. pp. 46 & 47. See also Kadivar; M. (1997); vol. i; pp. 41-48.   
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theocracy from the very beginning has been engaged in an erosive and destructive 
kulturkampf against the whole civil society, including the clerics. 
 
In fact the fundamentalist nature of the post-revolutionary hierocracy in Iran is best 
seen in its treatment of the clergy and seminaries in the country. For the first time in 
history the order of the religious seminaries and its internal hierarchy is directly 
dependent to the state.116 Before the revolution in 1979, no institution -religious or 
political- had the right to ex-communicate a member of the clergy. After the 
revolution Khomeini created the Special Court for the Clerics, which has been 
functioning as the sword of Damocles. In the early days of the revolution the special 
court functioned as a protection for the clerics by making them untouchable by the 
civil court. As time has passed, the same court has been used as a very effective tool 
for “prohibiting the influence of misguided clerics in the seminaries […] and for 
punishing disobedient members of clerics.”117 The special court system is today 
functioning as an independent punishment system where it has its own prison and 
intelligent police who scrutinize every single movement within the clergy, by 
reporting directly to the Islamic Republic’s leader. 
 
The Cultural Revolution in the early days after the clerics had seized political power 
is another illuminating example of Khomeini’s fundamentalism. By pointing out the 
universities and schools as the main enemy, due to “the fatal attacks against the nation 
from the universities and westernized scholars […] [being] more lethal than the 
wounds governments bayonets caused”118 the state  
 
pursued an “Islamization” program whose goal was to eliminate all forms of cultural 
resistance to ulama [i. e. the clerics] rule. The government kept closed all the universities and 
colleges for over three years, during which the university curricula were rewritten. By 1984, 
[…] nearly 15 percent of all the required courses for a bachelor’s degree were in the area of 
(Shi’i) religion. Similar changes were also made in the content of elementary and high school 
curricula. Courses dealing with evolution and portions of biological and geological courses 
were omitted from the school curriculum. In turn the number of required courses on religion 
increased considerably. Thousands of school teachers and university professors were purged. 
[…] In high schools, the use of laboratory experiments and scientific field trips were 
eliminated, while the performance of religious ceremonies increased considerably. Closed to 
four thousand university professors were purged. At Tehran University, the number of 
scientific personnel declined from 2,100 in 1978 to 1,500 in 1984. And the Minister of 
Sciences, in his report to the parliament, confessed that the number of university professors 
had declined from 13,900 in 1978 to 6500 in 1984.119  
 
In the dualistic and black and white worldview120 that constitutes the official ideology 
of the theocracy in Iran, there is simply one correct version of Islam, the 
government’s version. Hence plenty of classic works in theology are being reprinted, 
but if and only if they do pass the state’s requirements of right and wrong.121  
 
The post-revolutionary hierocracy in Iran, by its anachronism is more than anything 
else an ideological state, where the government’s defence of the cleric’s privatization 
of political power is its raison d'être. The history of the Labour Code is illuminating 
                                                
116 Khalaji; M. op. cit. p. 41. 
117 pp. 50-51. 
118 Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini quoted in Khaladji; M. op. cit. p. 59. 
119 Moaddel; M. (1993); p. 213 & 263. 
120 For a brief discussion on this feature of fundamentalism cf. Almond; G. A. op. cit. p. 38. 
121 Khaladji; M. op. cit. pp. 64-65; fn. 2. 
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in this respect. For years the unambiguous contradiction between normally accepted 
labour laws in modern capitalist societies and the principles of Islamic sharia’ meant 
that efforts to establish a code was doomed. Khomeini was worried that this festering 
dispute would aggravate extensive labour turmoil, especially in the heat of the Iran-
Iraq war. He therefore pronounced a fatwa authorizing the ratification of the Labour 
Code by the parliament in 1987. He bypassed its incompatibility with the principles of 
Islamic jurisprudence by subsuming these under the umbrella of the Expedience of the 
System. When he was criticized by some of his bewildered followers, he argued: 
  
Government which is a branch of the absolute rule of Allah’s prophet […] is one of Islam’s 
primary commandments (ahkam) and has priority over all subordinate commandments 
including prayers, fasting, and the haj. [i. e. pilgrimage] Government can stop any 
undertaking, whether devotional or non-devotional whose conduct is against the interests of 
Islam, [and] for as long as it remains such.122 
 
On the surface of it, this passage is evident proof that the theocracy in Iran is loosing 
its religious character. The reality is the opposite. What Khomeini does in this 
manoeuvre, is elevating the clerics to semi-God positions, where the arbitrariness of 
their power is painfully obvious. The Expedience of the System means that even God’s 
word can be broken when the clerics need to rescue its privileged position. Needless 
to say, it falls upon the clerics to decide when and what laws to break. 
 
By downplaying the role of ideology Abrahamian seems, as we have seen, to believe 
that the theocracy in Iran “contains the potential for change and acceptance of 
modernity- even eventually of political pluralism, gender equality, individual rights, 
and social democracy.”123 He makes this assertion based on the pragmatic manoeuvres 
of Khomeini, among which he takes Khomeini’s change of heart regarding women’s 
right to vote.124  
 
However Khomeini’s change of view on women’s political right has to be explained 
due to historical circumstances in the revolutionary years. During the revolutionary 
years 1977-1979, every major city in Iran was filled with people protesting against the 
Pahlavi’s dictatorship, and Iranian women were a major part of the revolutionary 
movement. To go against women’s right to vote in such circumstances would be 
nothing less than political suicide for Khomeini and his supporters. However, as the 
events regarding the first International Women’s Day on 8th of March in 1979 shows, 
this does not imply that Khomeini would yield to any democratic demands.  
 
On that day, Iranian women activists and their male supporters demonstrated in Tehran and 
Qom against an order for women to re-veil themselves in the traditional chador worn by highly 
religious women. The demonstrations continued for five days. At their height, they attracted tens 
of thousands in Tehran, men as well as women. Some leftist men formed a cordon around the 
women, fighting off armed attackers from a newly formed group, the Hezbollah or “Party of 
God”. The demonstrators chanted “No to the Chador,” “Down with the Dictatorship,” and even 
                                                
122 Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, quoted in Shalgooni; M. R. op. cit. p. 28. “[…] Two fatwas [were] 
issued by Khomeini in late 1987 and early 1988 dealing with the hegemonic power of the state. In 
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that the state could even abrogate one of the five pillars of Islam if it saw that this was necessary for the 
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spawned it were tantamount to Islam itself.” Akhavi; Sh. op. cit. p. 101.  
123 Abrahamian; E. (1993); pp. 2-3. 
124 pp. 33-34.  
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the occasional “Down with Khomeini.” One banner read, “We made the Revolution for 
Freedom, But Got Unfreedom,” while other proclaimed “In The Down of Freedom, We Have 
No freedom.” For their part, the Hezbollah chanted ”You will cover yourselves or be beaten,” 
but their responses was mainly nonverbal; stones, knives, and even bullets.125 
 
Khomeini was quite candid in his writings before the revolution in categorically 
rejecting democracy. In his lectures on the Governance of the Jurisprudent, he is 
absolutely clear on this point.  
 
Islamic government is conditional, not in the sense that it depends on the will of the majority, 
but the governors are conditioned in executing the laws in the Qur’an and the Sunna. […] 
Being just and knowing the law is the requirements for the jurists to rule. […] It’s a common 
mistake to believe that the Prophet had more to as ruler, than other jurists. He was more 
virtuous than anyone else, but that doesn’t mean he had more to say as a ruler.126   
 
Consequently, Khomeini cut the Gordian knot of the ancient Euthyphro dilemma 
formulated by Plato127, by raising the clerics to God-like positions. Virtue was now by 
definition what the government defined it to be in the post-revolutionary Iran.128 
 
As we see here, the clerics in Khomeini’s radical interpretation of Islam is above 
society and have ipso facto a privileged position. To focus on the fact that he changed 
his mind on women’s right to vote is to be unable to see the wood for all the trees, 
because in Khomeini’s political theory, not only women, but every citizen lacks 
political rights.  
 
To see this, suppose that the government in Iran would remove every obstacle for a 
free political election, and even would allow international observers. Nevertheless, 
according to the constitution the leader of the theocracy has the legal authority to 
dismiss every election.  
 
In his comparison between the theocracy in Iran and populist dictatorships in Latin 
America, Abrahamian misses several characteristics of the post-revolutionary 
hierocracy. Unlike ‘normal’ dictatorships, the theocracy in Iran is an active 
dictatorship, which means that the state is always trying to eliminate differences 
between the private and the public spheres and even tries to eliminate the civil 
society. During the Pahlavi dynasty, political activism, especially with democratic 
ambitions, could never be tolerated. However the repression in the theocracy is not 
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‘only’ political, the repression is above anything else a civil repression, i. e. the state 
actively surveys and represses every deviation from the state’s official ideology.  
 
The legitimacy of the theocracy has been decreasing ever since the clergy seized 
political power. Parallel with the loss of political legitimacy, the state’s repression has 
increased and got more and more arbitrary. Generally speaking, in order for a state to 
survive, it needs to balance between leadership “based on consent, and “domination” 
[…] based on coercion.”129 Khomeini’s manoeuvres during the revolutionary years, 
before the consolidation of the state and its reign of terror to get a full grasp of 
society, need to be explained from the fact the Khomeini seized political power 
through a popular mass revolution. In order to deprive the millions of people -who 
were actively participating in the revolutionary process- from every political right, 
Khomeini needed to be populist and act according to Machiavelli.130  
 
Some clarification is needed here. Nota bene the arguments above do not refute 
Abrahamian’s argument per se. The ‘essence’ of a political body does not in itself 
imply neither the ability to reform itself, nor the inability to do so. Stated differently, 
whether the theocracy in Iran is understood to be populist or fundamentalist, does not 
affect the question above. In order to be able to answer the question scientifically and 
not by faith, one needs to examine the social, economic and political context on the 
subject. 
 
Dictatorships generally employ political reforms if the reforms strengthen the political 
order.131 The White Revolution in the 1960s is one example. The monarchy was under 
pressure from the US to respect human rights. A decade after the coup d’état, when 
the state had eliminated every resistance, liberal or Marxist, the Shah announced that 
he himself would introduce the reforms that “ushered in a short “breathing period””.132 
He did so, because he was certain he had a tight grasp on the population and any 
objection could be effectively crushed.  
 
The situation in the post-revolutionary hierocracy is quite different. From its very 
beginning, the theocracy has been forced to rule with the iron fist. Every little reform 
can jeopardize its whole existence. One should remember that a yearlong protest 
movement in every major city in Iran preceded the Arab Spring. The reason the 
theocracy in Iran is not capable to reform itself has nothing to do with its ‘essence’. 
The theocracy’s inability to reform the political system stems from the fact that every 
reform, how small and insignificant it might be, makes the system even more 
vulnerable.  
 
In comparing khomeinism with Third World populism, Abrahamian also seems to 
downplay the anachronism of the theocracy in Iran. In contemporary capitalism there 
is a clear separation between the political and the economic spheres.  
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The differentiation of the economic sphere in capitalism, […] the social function of 
production and distribution, surplus extraction and appropriation, and the allocation of social 
labour are, so to speak, privatized and they are achieved by non-authoritative, non political 
means. In other words, the social allocation of resources and labour does not, on the whole, 
take place by means of political direction, communal deliberation, hereditary duty, custom, or 
religious obligation, but rather through the mechanisms of commodity exchange.133 
 
The case of the theocracy in Iran is the opposite. The cleric’s political power is the 
sine qua non of its economic power. In fact the more we have moved from the days of 
the revolution in 1979, the more ideological the state has become. During the 
presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Millennialism and Messianism were much 
more ubiquitous than ever before.134  
 
Final reflections 
In this last section I will review the questions stated at the beginning. The strength of 
Abrahamian’s criticism of fundamentalism as a concept lies in the fact that he 
analyses the Iranian case in its own right and not simply as part of the Muslim world. 
In this he makes a strong case against the view that sees religion as the main force in 
an otherwise passive Muslim culture. Furthermore he has been able to empirically 
show the modern nature of khomeinism as a political and social movement.  
 
As we have seen fundamentalism is generally rejected, by a reference to its Western 
and un-Islamic origin. Abrahamian’s rejection is beside ‘originism’, supported by its 
supposedly incommensurability with modernity. Thus we arrive at the second 
question, i. e the relationship between modernity and fundamentalism. In the final 
stance this is a question of definition and as I have been trying to argue, there is a 
perfectly valid and reasonable definition of fundamentalism as an anti-modernist 
phenomenon generated through modernity. 
 
Furthermore, regarding the question of fundamentalism vs. populism I have been 
arguing that Khomeini’s populism is more a consequence of the fact that the clerics in 
Iran came to power through a popular political revolution, and hence the populist 
character of the theocracy is part of the state’s attempts to legitimize its anti-
democratic rule.     
 
In the light of what I have been examining, rejecting fundamentalism as an analytical 
tool in describing the post-revolutionary hierocracy in Iran seems impetuous. The next 
question that naturally rises, is how khomeinism in a modern country like Iran in 1979 
could be the determinative revolutionary force that not only defeated the monarchy, it 
also outmanoeuvred the secular discourses, be it Marxism or Liberal Nationalism. 
However, this question requires its own paper. 
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